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Abstract
Warwick Junction, a thriving trading hub in the inner city of Durban, has long been
considered one of the best examples of collaborative urban management practices
between the local government and informal traders. In a post-apartheid South Africa,
there was a national desire to transform the old systems of governance, which in
Warwick translated to city government institutions making an effort to include informal
traders in the policymaking and management processes. This paper tracks the history of
Warwick Junction, using its oppressive past to frame common perspectives of informal
trade. It considers the legacy of the post-apartheid era South Africa, how it led to an
effective area based management initiative, and what has transpired since. Primarily
relying on interviews, it will present a variety of perspectives from a variety of
stakeholders: past and present City officials, formal shopkeepers, informal traders, and
leaders of local non-governmental organizations. This paper will find that the spirit of
collaboration from the early period of the post-apartheid period has broken down over
time. While City officials and informal traders offer different accounts, a common trend
is that much work remains to be done in the Warwick area, yet the processes to
complete this reform are no longer collaborative. This paper will offer some
explanations for the deterioration but will ultimately suggest the need for more research
regarding the management of Warwick Junction after twenty years of democratic rule.
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Introduction
Despite the nuanced nature, history, and role of the informal economy, one trend
continues to persist: informal trade is often viewed as a nuisance or problem to be
rectified or ignored. Although the fact that it makes up a substantial part of many
developing countries’ gross domestic products, government policies tend to be reactive
instead of being proactive. Across the globe, interventions are sporadic, unfocused and
inconsistent. South Africa, a developing country battling high unemployment rates and
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a repressive history dating from the colonial and apartheid eras, had the opportunity to
reverse this pattern when it transitioned to a democracy in 1994.1 The national desire to
reconcile and harmonize in many ways characterized the methods and process of
governance.2 Warwick Junction, transportation and trading hub on the outskirts of
Durban’s inner city, presents a fascinating case study of these approaches. Often cited
as one of the best examples of innovative and integrated urban management and areabased policy, academic literature focuses on Warwick in the period immediately after
apartheid.
Yet, as this paper will show, twenty years after the establishment of democracy,
the condition of governance in Warwick has deteriorated although, in a glaring gap,
little literature addresses this. Despite these gaps, this paper will explain the informal
trade sector on a global scale, and provide a narrative and analysis of street vending in
Durban and South Africa. The purpose of this paper is understand how the inclusive,
area based management governance model in Warwick broke down, and what
implications that suggests.
To convey this, this paper is organized into five sections. First, it will offer an
overview of the relevant literature, and an analysis of the gaps in the academia. Next, it
will provide the necessary background information to contextualize the most recent

Skinner, C. (2008). The Struggle for the Streets: Processes of Exclusion and Inclusion of Street Traders in
Durban, South Africa. Development Southern Africa Vol. 25, No. 2, 227-242.
2 Dobson, R. Former Project Leader. Formal Interview. 14 November 2013.
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events, which have not yet been incorporated into academic literature. The penultimate
section establishes the methodology and limitations of the project. Lastly, the paper will
recount its findings and draw conclusions.

Literature Review
To understand the nature of informal trade, and how institutions and social
relations exist around it, this paper will review some of the extensive literature written
on the informal economy. In addition, it will examine a management policy particularly
relevant to Warwick Junction during the end of the apartheid period. Lastly, it will offer
an overview of the state and extent of informal trade in South Africa, providing a
narrative and analysis of street trading in Durban, concluding with an assessment on
the current state of literature regarding Warwick Junction.

Global Trends and Debates
Street trading is a controversial, fluctuating, and diverse occupation present in
virtually every area of the world.3 Particularly prevalent in developing countries, the
informal economy accounts for 50-75% of the non-agricultural employment. Broken
down regionally, the informal trade sector makes up 78% of the non-agricultural labor

Bromley, R. (2000). Street Vending and Public Policy: A Global Review. The International Journal of
Sociology and Social Policy 20.1/2, 1-28. 1
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force in Africa, 57% in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 45-85% in Asia.4 Informal
trade practices vary: traders may sell services, merchandise or a mixture of the two.
Some may be mobile and hawk from trays or carts, while others set up kiosks or rely on
fixed stalls, while still others simply lay their goods out on the ground. Traders may sell
seasonally or year-round. They may change the goods they offer depending on the time
of day and what needs consumers may have, selling breakfast or hot drinks in the
morning as commuters make their way to work, or fresh produce in the afternoons as
customers return home to cook dinner. Goods may range from cooked foods and
groceries to electrical appliances, hardware, clothing, or mechanical repairs.5 Traders
may rely on assistants or family as partners, depend on neighbors to tend their stalls,
create branches of their businesses or work completely alone. Street trading can be a
person’s last resort to survive or simply may be a lifestyle choice.6 In addition, many
other activities, from public transportation such as taxis and buses, to garbage
collection, street cleaning and maintenance are closely tied to street trading.7 This sector
is complex and nuanced, which presents considerable urban management challenges
and creates controversial debates as to the role and legitimacy of the informal economy.

Quazi, T. (2011). An Analysis of Municipal Approaches to Incorporating the Informal Economy into the
Urban Fabric: A Comparative Study of Msunduzi Local Municipality (Pietermaritzburg) and Hibiscus
Coast Municipality (Port Shepstone). University of KwaZulu-Natal School of Development Studies, 1-82. 11
5 Bromley “Street Vending and Public Policy” 2
6 Bromley “Street Vending and Public Policy” 2, Cross, J. (2000). Street Vendors, Modernity and
Postmodernity: Conflict and Compromise in the Global Economy. The International Journal of Sociology and
Social Policy 20.1/2, 29-51. 7
7 Bromley “Street Vending and Public Policy” 2
4
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In his global review of street vending and public policy, Ray Bromley
summarizes the main arguments justifying the existence and extent of street trade. For
one, street traders contribute directly to the economy, and their eradication would have
serious and negative economic consequences. Not only does street trading advance
economic activity but it is also a potential and actual source of revenue for the
government through tax regulation. In addition, street trading offers the government a
respite from expanding the welfare, police, court or prison systems as it provides
employment and a safety net to the traders and their dependents. Another point is that
street traders bring vitality and resources to the streets that cannot be replicated. Not
only do street traders create an atmosphere, their presence and potential as witnesses
may deter crime. Street traders also expand the range and timing of services that can be
provided and serve as an effective way to cater for “seasonal, sporadic and special
demands” such as food during sporting events or trinkets for holidays. Expanding on
that argument, they are able to test new products on the market at low costs. Not only
does street trading create a “laboratory for family business and social interaction,” it
offers entrepreneurial opportunities as a self-help, grassroots initiative. Bromley cites
Hernando de Soto (1989), stating that street trading encourages the independence of
“hard-working poor people [from] an obstructive, ‘mercantilist’ system…controlled by
the interests of career bureaucrats and big businesses.”8 Lastly, street trading has a

8
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deeply rooted history in many countries. Yet a vocal resistance to informal trading
combats these historical, cultural, entrepreneurial, and economic arguments.
Despite the opportunities it provides for its workforce, street trading is often
seen as an illegitimate and unsightly blight on ‘modern’ cities. Critics blame traders for
vehicular and pedestrian congestion, as traders are drawn to busy areas where demand
may be high, which ultimately poses a public safety hazard. In addition, this crowding
may provide opportunities for petty crime. The movement of traders may also result in
them “blocking” formal businesses and forestalling off-street establishments, giving
them an unfair advantage. The fact that street traders “often fail to give receipts and
keep accounts, to pay taxes on their earnings, and to charge sales or value,” enhances
this advantage. Benefitting from the lack of taxes and fewer overheads, they may
undercut their formal competition. The culture of street trading generates noise which
may disturb pedestrians and motorists, creating “unreasonable nuisance” concerns. In
addition, garbage often litters the streets as a result of the traffic, traders and their
customers. Lastly, there have been health and safety concerns as informal traders are
more exposed to sun, air pollution and contamination.9 These are the practical
arguments against the presence of informal traders on the streets.
A more theoretical point is the orthodox Marxist view that considers street
traders as “the epitome of surplus labor and underemployment.” Deterring labor from

9
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legitimate work in construction, manufacturing, agriculture, education and health, care
fields, this perspective argues informal trade is “dysfunctional to the economy as a
whole.”10 While not entirely consistent, this view reinforces the structuralist perspective
on street trading which came out of the 1970s and 1980s. Structuralists took the position
that informal trading occurred as a result of capitalism’s inability to absorb the masses
of unemployed.11 While they may not see it as quite the nuisance Marxists perceive it as,
the implication is that structuralists also see street trading as a result of a flawed
economic system.
These theoretical stances illustrate the fact that negative perceptions of street
trading remain. A variety of political perspectives, from right-and left-wing statists,
modernists and authoritarians, characterize street trading as a “manifestation of
poverty and underdevelopment,” a view that is shared by many governments.12
Bromley summarizes a common state of affairs for street traders:
“In many cities and countries, police and municipal inspectors have
threatened, chased, arrested and occasionally beaten street vendors, and
their goods have often been confiscated. Aggressive policing is
particularly notable just before major public and tourist events, on the
assumption that orderly streets improve the image of the city to visitors.
In some Third World Counties such policies have been carried out to
vicious extremes, when police, soldiers or para-military forces have

Bromley 5
Skinner, Caroline. (2008). Street Trade in Africa: A Review. Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing
and Organizing, Working Paper No. 51, 1-37. 5
12 Bromley “Street Vending and Public Policy” 6
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confiscated street vendors’ identity papers, physically expelled vendors
from the city, and even tortured or killed a few vendors.”13
This brings light to the driving tension regarding street trade and the informal
economy. The ‘disorder’ of these markets contradicts the organized, efficient and
structured world championed by Marx and the Euro-American value system.14 That
being said, street trading, despite its setbacks and critics, continues to be a thriving and
growing source of work, with the potential for more expansion.15

Theoretical Framework
Although this paper will not delve too deeply into conceptual frameworks, a
little background will provide some valuable structure. One perspective, the political
economy theory, which focuses on policy and institutional environments and the
subsequent connections to administrative practices, relates well to informal trade
management. The political economy approach attempts to understand and explain the
interactions between economic, political and social policies, institutions and processes.
The theory examines how physical space, cultural norms and social relations are
affected issues of domination, power and resource allocation. This perspective asserts
that prevalent institutions drive urban management and that city governance is based
on current economic, political and social circumstances. Constantly evolving, urban
Ibid.
Cross “ Street Vendors, Modernity and Postmodernity” 3-4
15 Quazi “An Analysis of Municipal Approaches” 16
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plans strongly affect both the informal and formal economy, and their interactions and
adaptations reflect the power struggle as the various groups attempt to hold and gather
resources. Most importantly, this theory draws on the factors that affect political and
institutional environments as well as those environments’ capacity to change.16
This framework ties to the urban challenges that have arisen in South Africa as a
result of inherited institutions and infrastructures. Many studies point to that fact many
developing countries, particularly those in the global South, rely on inherited systems
that were planned by colonial governments or adapted from Northern contexts and to
meet modernized expectations. These expectations are focused on “suiting local
political and ideological ends [with] aspirations of modern urbanization.”17 This creates
tension for traders who are challenged by this infrastructure and these expectations,
while simultaneously creating difficulties for government officials who must manage
them.

Urban Management Approaches
As previously mentioned, the complex nature of the informal economy presents
serious urban management challenges. Although some governments may be tempted to
simply overlook the entire informal economy or repress and abuse street traders, its
consistent growth and widespread prevalence across the world demands attention.
16
17

Quazi “An Analysis of Municipal Approaches” 7-8
Ibid.
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Instead of continuing to focus on how it may devalue a city’s modern status, inclusive
urban management processes would be ideal. Much of the scholarship regarding the
policy practices for the informal economy focuses on case studies, such as Warwick
Junction in Durban, South Africa. While this paper will address and consider that
model, an overview of inclusive urban management debates is valuable.
In particular, integrated and area based policies offer a worthwhile approach. For
the purposes of this paper, we will subscribe to Ivan Turok’s definition of area-based
policies. As the name suggests these are policies explicitly focused on an area rather
than a national or provincial scale. Yet the substance in that definition comes from the
acknowledgement that an area based policy (ABP) is intended to change or improve the
nature of a geographical area using a process that involves all stakeholders, including
community members that may be overlooked when using other approaches. There is an
acceptance that place and space matter, and affect both economic and social processes.
This method tends to accept a variety of social, economic and physical development
concerns and priorities, such as businesses, human resources, and neighborhood and
social economies.18 In addition, it realizes that management must cross a variety of
government fields and departments such as education, housing, transport and
economic development, and that a uniform approach, particularly regarding the
allocation of resources or regulations, is not ideal. Instead, every policy approach and
Cameron, J., Odendaal, N. & Todes, A. (2004) Integrated Area Development Projects: Working towards
Innovation and Sustainability. Urban Forum, Vol. 15, No. 4. 316
18

15

structure will depend entirely on the nature of each area and its accompanying
geographical and institutional contexts.19
However, that final point – that policies are unique to the area – illustrates one of
the key objections against ABPs. The entire system can be critiqued as too inefficient
and difficult to manage as policies inconsistent with national priorities become
institutionalized. Further, community participation is not necessarily an easy or
harmonious process as different needs or values arise. In that vein, the allocation of
resources is meant to reflect greater needs, but meets with resistance on many levels.
This shift of resources may be seen as deviating from “statutory obligations” to provide
equal services. There is particular pressure on authorities from wealthier
neighborhoods to maintain consistent levels of spending across the board, instead of
“bending” programs to benefit the poor. In addition, there could be unforeseen
consequences of focusing in particular regions, as issues may be displaced into
surrounding areas. In particular, if a jurisdiction changes or expands, the policies may
no longer be as effective, and the area may become unmanageable. Another concern is
that ABPs are characterized by bottom up transformation, which requires flexibility as
services and standards may be changed to meet with the community’s needs. There is
less space to govern by the rigid protocols of national programs like the welfare system.
This means that achieving the desired change requires additional commitment from the
Turok, I. The Rationale for Area-Based Policies: Lessons from International Experience. Urban
Reconstruction in the Developing World: Learning through an International Best Practice, 405-412. 1-2
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local departments to incorporate the priorities and needs of neighborhood reforms,
which is not necessarily viable. On a related note, the last criticism of ABP Turok
recognizes is the challenge of coordinated, inter-departmental policymaking and
resource deployment. A key to ABP is strategically breaking down the “silos and
funnels” through which decisions are made and services are delivered to coordinate
and “link complementary elements of provision together.”20 Yet, as with the bottom up
reform, this flexibility and willingness is often contradictory to the nature of many
government institutions and poses consequential challenges.
However, these critiques are challenged, if not denounced, by the arguments for
ABPs. The involvement of the community allows for more flexible and customized
approaches to governance. The policy that generates from ABPs is “more intensive,
person-centered and [proactively supportive] than is usually provided or available
through government schemes.”21 This inclusive approach has a few key characteristics.
One of the traditional objectives is to inform the decision makers of local needs and
preferences, which in turn gives a voice to people who are often under-represented in
the policy process. This may even serve to diffuse a volatile situation. Over time, this
process has become recognized as a method of constructive engagement and capacity
building. It came about as a result of people recognizing that the capacity of the

20
21
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government is finite, that there may be untapped resources available in the community,
and the possibility that harnessing the community’s resources may benefit all involved.
Other benefits include the encouragement of community activism and
autonomy. While there may be many organizations in place, from church groups, youth
clubs and sports associations, this process of equipping these bodies with greater skills
and confidence better prepares them to take advantage of external opportunities. This
strengthening of a community’s ‘social economy’ will sustain its commitment and
investment in development, which ultimately may take some of the pressure off of
government shoulders.22

South African Informal Economy
It is impossible to analyze the nature of street trading in South Africa, or examine
the existing scholarship, without briefly explaining the history of that sector in South
Africa. A great deal of scholarship contextualizes itself around or immediately after the
apartheid era. However, as Stein Nesvag elucidates, even before apartheid rule, policies
from the colonial era targeted informal traders. Legislation like the 1981 Chapter 14
Natal Code of Natal Law and Zululand Proclamation in 1985 limited muthi (traditional
African medicine) trade, clearly singling out African traders. Only a few years later in

22
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1987, Act No. 18 legislation was passed giving authorities discretionary power to refuse
licenses to “all applicants whose premises were in an unhygienic condition or who were
unable to comply with the conditions of the Insolvency law regarding the keeping of
proper accounts.”23 While hygienic regulation is a logical concern, Nesvag argues that
the focus on proper accounts would particularly impact informal traders. Similarly, the
1909 Native Beer Act negatively affected female traders who sold beer as it established a
municipality monopoly on the substance.
As national legislation became more restrictive over the next fifty years, the
policies continued to target African informal traders. The Native or Urban Areas Act of
1923, an outcome of the Stallard Commission Report, limited Africans’ ability to work
in the urban areas. As the report concluded, “Africans were required in cities for the
sole reason of servicing white needs, and once they ceased to do so, they were to depart
back to the reserves,” black traders had little autonomy to cater to consumers, and
never on their own terms.24 Other legislation, particularly the Black (Urban Areas)
Consolidation Act (1945) reinforced this persecution. The Consolidation Act continued
to impose restrictions on economic activities even in so-called “black areas.”25 This trend
of persecution only continued in the apartheid era as non-whites, who make up the
informal trade sector, continued to be targeted.

Nesvag, S. (2000). Street Trading from Apartheid to Post-Apartheid: More Birds in the Cornfield? The
International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 20.3/4, 34-63. 3-4
24 Nesvag “Street Trading from Apartheid to Post-Apartheid” 4
25 Skinner “The Struggle for the Streets” 5
23
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The Group Areas Act (1950) excluded people from areas of the city based on
their race, which essentially barred Africans from trading.26 The 1957 Witchcraft
Suppression Act banned the trading of medicine and herbs, completely cutting muthi
traders out of the economy. The effects of this act were felt for almost thirty years, as
muthi traders did not begin openly trading until the 1980s.27 However, despite these
regulations, the national government struggled to maintain control of informal traders,
which led to new legislation. For example, in the KwaZulu-Natal region, the Natal
Ordinance was passed in 1973, establishing the “move on” laws. These laws, although
technically allowing informal trading, were hugely restrictive. While traders were able
to hawk their goods, they had to move along from their spot within 15 minutes and
were not allowed to return that day. In addition, the traders could not be closer than 100
meters from a formal business.28 Although this is merely a sampling, these laws offer
insight into the extent of the anti-informal trade attitudes the colonial and apartheid
governments subscribed to.
To bring the narrative up to date, the post-apartheid era of democracy brought in
a new approach to governance. Skinner argues there was a national surge to transform
institutional structures into more collaborative entities. Local governments were given

Shipley, B. and R. Richards. (2013). Warwick Junction Urban Renewal Project. Participedia.
<http://participedia.net/en/cases/warwick-junction-urban-renewal-project>.
27 Dobson, R. and C. Skinner. (2009). Working in Warwick: Including Street Traders in Urban Plans.
University of KwaZulu-Natal School of Development Studies. Print.
28 Dobson and Skinner “Working in Warwick” 45
26
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greater independence to supervise their areas, which would prove vital to informal
trade management. There was a general trend of deregulation which contributed to the
rapid expansion of the informal trade sector. For example, the 1991 Business Act helped
to deregulate business activities, removed barriers to the operation of informal
activities, and made it an offense to enforce the move-along laws.29 The new
Constitution (1996) mandated local governments to take certain approaches to informal
trade: namely to promote local development and focus on pro-poor urban policies to
assist employment opportunities, to re-regulate the informal economy and, lastly, to
emphasize “participation and consultation” to practice democratic governance.30
However, the rapidly increasing levels of urbanization and growing prevalence of
informal activities, particularly around transport nodes on the peripheries of city
centers and in public areas, have created infrastructure, facility and resource challenges
for local governments.
As the current situation stands, the informal trade sector is a consequential part
of the South African economy. To offer some statistical context, unemployment rates are
high, hovering around 25%.31 The formal economy is unable to absorb these
unemployed, who then turn to the informal economy to provide a source of income. In
the period from 1997-2003, that growing unemployment and the small capacity for

Skinner “The Struggle for the Streets” 6
Quazi “An Analysis of Municipal Approaches” 19
31 Trading Economics. South African Unemployment Rate. 25 November 2013.
<http://www.tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/unemployment-rate>.
29
30
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growth in the formal economy caused the informal economy to expand drastically. In
2003, about 25.1% of the South African population was employed in the informal
economy; about 1.9 million people vs. the 965,000 who made up that sector in 1997.
Now, the informal economy contributes to about 8-12% of the country’s GDP.32 It must
be noted that these statistics ought to be treated with caution as they do not account for
informal workers in rural economies or the changing nature of the informal sector as
seasonal work offers temporary employment opportunities. In fact, there is little data on
the actual expanse of the informal economy, other than that it has a significant presence.
Nonetheless, this portion of the South African workforce faces many challenges, and is
a vulnerable population.
For over a century, informal workers were largely unrecognized as contributors
to the economy. Even now, although they may be recognized, they face other
challenges. For one, many of the informal traders are migrants from other African
countries, who then may not speak the local languages and are more likely to be
unaware of their rights. Much of the literature regarding informal trade examines or
mentions the role of foreign vendors working on South African streets. A study by Nina
Hunter and Caroline Skinner, “Foreign Street Traders Working in Inner City Durban:
Local Government Policy Challenges,” examined the policy challenges of having
foreign street traders working on Durban streets. In their final policy recommendations,
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they noted that Durban’s new Informal Economy Policy (IEP) acknowledged the issue
of foreign street traders. Yet many of the policy recommendations the IEP proposed
have, as of yet, been ignored.33 In addition, many of the traders in the informal
workforce are largely uneducated. One study indicated that as few as 10% of the
informal traders completed high school.34 Perhaps most importantly, there is a strong
correlation between poverty and informal trade. Despite the fact that informal traders
make up about 16-20% of the South African labor force, and a large number of these
traders are either the sole breadwinners for their families or at least have a substantial
number of dependents, a study of Durban street traders found that the average weekly
profit was R102. More staggering is the fact that almost 50% of the traders in the study
reported profits of less than R60 per week.35 In addition to the personal challenges this
workforce faces, and despite the reformed policies of the post-apartheid era, street
traders are still subject to complicated, and in many ways abusive, sanctions.

The Narrative of Street Trade in Warwick Junction, Durban
The history of informal trade in Durban is extensive, complex and noteworthy.
One area in particular, Warwick Junction, highlights the challenges and struggles of
informal trade for South Africa. Warwick Junction is Durban’s largest transportation

Hunter, N. and C. Skinner. (2003). Foreign Street Traders Working in Inner City Durban: Local
Government Policy Challenges. Urban Forum, Vol. 14, No. 4, October-December 2003, 301-319. 313
34 Ibid. 9
35 Skinner “The Struggle for the Streets” 4
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node and trading hub, located on the outskirts of the inner city. About 460,000 people
walk through the area daily, which hosts between 5,000 – 8,000 traders. In addition, 300
buses and 1,550 minibus taxis depart from the junction on a daily basis and 38,000
vehicles pass through daily.36 More importantly, Warwick Junction is considered a
shining example of a progressive and innovative approach to integrating the informal
traders into the management and development practices of the area. Yet the narrative of
Warwick Junction, covered extensively in many academic articles, is crucial to
understanding and analyzing the modern dynamics of the area as this paper sets out to.
The national legislation described above shaped the nature of informal trade in
Durban. Like the rest of the country, Durban had repressive apartheid-era legislation
imposed on the informal traders, restricting their ability to work. However, when the
Progressive Federal Party (PFP) won local government elections in the early 1980s, a
new era of progressive policies was ushered in. Stein Nesvag explains a few of the
factors that inspired the city council to shift policies:
• A realization that law enforcement was becoming increasingly ineffective;
• A concession of the economic immorality and dysfunctionality of the existing
legislation;
• An escalating urban unemployment, as well as massive urbanization as
apartheid influx controls began collapsing;
• Organized mass resistance and strong international pressure against the
apartheid;
• An increasing international focus on the informal sector and its potential
contribution to solving problems of unemployment and poverty;

36
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• The general international move towards economic liberalization37
In response to these pressures and to assess the approaches to street trading
Durban had been practicing, the PFP commissioned two reports: the 1983 Market
Survey and the 1984 Hawker Report. Both suggested a complete reversal from
established policy, radically concluding, “The illegal status of the street trader [must] be
re-evaluated.”38 Instead of endorsing the original plan that would have, staying true to
apartheid-era development, moved the informal sector in Warwick Junction from the
central business district to a separate area, the reports recognized the importance of the
location of informal market areas to attract business. In addition, the reports made two
other crucial points. For one, they argued for a simpler approach to regulation,
particularly regarding licensing laws and the establishment of “immune zones,” in
which the traders could operate on a “first-come, first served” basis. The second point
was the recognition that control is key for a functioning informal economy, but that
such regulation must be fair to the traders. These arguments did not only completely
disregard previous policy, but advocated on the part of the traders.39
As a result, with the intention of trying to find ways to implement more practical
and favorable policies for street traders, the City formed the Councilor’s Subcommittee
in 1985. As national trends became more progressive and gave more power to local
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authorities with the 1987 National White Paper of Privatization and Deregulation, the
1991 Business Act, and the 1993 Amended Business Act, the Subcommittee and City of
Durban amended and revised policy.
Signs of Durban’s commitment to assist traders became evident when the City
published its by-laws in 1995. Unlike Johannesburg, which made the entire inner city a
no-trade zone, Durban, while prohibiting some areas of the inner city as trade zones,
established restricted zones and trading sites. However, this more progressive policy
was hampered by Durban’s mandate to stay consistent with national legislation which
insisted all by-laws state “that traders who contravene any of these clauses, including
trading in an area declared restricted or prohibited, will have their goods removed and
impounded and be liable to pay a fine or be imprisoned.” Sanctions against traders
continued to be criminal rather than administrative, and “1996 was marked by this
tough stance towards street trading.”40
Yet, despite these setbacks, the trend of integration and negotiation in Warwick
Junction continued throughout the next decade, as street trading boomed in the 1990s.
The substantial growth of street trading in Durban was not simply due to the
increasingly lenient policies of the 1980s but also as a result of several natural disasters,
including two floods and a severe drought which drove rural South Africans into the
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city.41 To handle the growing population of traders and changing policies, various
organizations were established to better facilitate interactions between traders and the
City, including the Self Employed Women’s Union in 1994, the Informal Traders
Management Board in 1995, StreetNet in 2002, Siyagunda in 2005, and Asiye eTafuleni
in 2008. Most importantly, the City launched an ABM initiative in 1996: the Urban
Renewal Project (the iTRUMP Project). Establishing an ABM policy allowed the City to
cooperatively tackle urban management challenges, diminish contentious relationships
between urban managers and informal traders, and led to more appropriate
interventions for the informal traders. While various organizations and actors played
key roles in the development and management reform around Warwick, the City’s
iTRUMP Project is the source of praise as it sought to integrate traders into discussions
and, through the Informal Economy Policy, institutionalized the City’s reformed policy
towards informal trade.
Previously, City interventions had been sporadic and ineffective as each
government department failed to communicate and responded differently to
challenges. However, the new policy of collaboration meant that the City worked with
informal traders, their organizations, and a variety of government departments to
establish the necessary management and ongoing reform around Warwick Junction and
the markets. Recognizing different sectors had unique needs, the City designed and
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created specific infrastructure, including storage space, tailored to the needs of specific
informal trade sectors. Within the span of three years, Warwick Junction became a safer,
cleaner and more vibrant space where informal trade flourishes.42 Most importantly, the
City attempted to institutionalize its approach and policy towards the informal
economy. However, despite Durban’s progressive post-apartheid policies, the City’s
approach in the last decade has begun to shift and the situation is worsening for
informal traders. There has been a disjuncture between the intent of the legislation and
the implementation on the ground. While the policies were intended to be inclusive and
protect their rights, the traders are becoming marginalized.43 In June 2004, Metro Police
removed traders’ goods at various intersections throughout the city, specifically the
central business district and neighboring middle-class suburbs. The Daily News reported
a Metro Police spokesperson saying “We have seized tons of their goods in our clean up
operation… We won’t let up until we have cleaned them all out.”44 Later that year, the
Council approved the Public Realm Management Project, intended to stop “illegal
unlicensed street trading.” A R3.7 million budget was assigned to the project for six
months to employ and equip 50 Metro Police Officers. Ironically named “Peace
Officers,” they were armed. The City justified this decision citing complaints from
formal business owners. Supposedly, as The Daily News reported, “Illegal street traders
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are creating a terrible headache for shop [owners and members of the public…It is
important to make sure [the city] also addresses the needs of the city’s rates base by
ensuring the concerns of formal businesses.”45
Most recently, tensions have been growing between the various Warwick
Junction stakeholders over a proposed development in the area. In preparation for the
2010 FIFA World Cup, the City proposed to replace the Early Morning Market, one of
the largest and oldest markets of Warwick, with a mall. Keeping true to Bromley’s point
about aggressive policing before a major tourist event, the City’s approach was
combative and exclusive. In complete contradiction of its own rules, the City failed to
follow the appropriate regulations. The City did not consult the traders about the
renovations, nor did it complete an environmental impact assessment.46 Newspaper
stories illustrate the extent of the tension as violence erupted between traders and the
police on a few occasions.
However, the fact that newspaper stories are the primary source of information
about the current Warwick Junction is noteworthy in its own way. There are massive
amounts of literature regarding the informal economy and its accompanying policies in
developing countries. As already mentioned, Warwick Junction and Durban’s policies
are often cited and heralded as excellent and innovative approaches to managing and
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integrating informal trade into the economy and policymaking process. Yet it seems
that the conciliatory attitudes that were so prevalent at the end of the apartheid era
have begun to fade as relationships between Warwick Junction stakeholders
deteriorated. Although the largest controversy, that of a proposed mall, has only been
an issue in the last five years, little academic literature has been written on the turn in
the City Council’s approach and its implications for inclusive management. In a paper
from 2009, one notable expert, Caroline Skinner, divulged a preliminary analysis
pointing to two issues that may have driven this change: the relationship between the
city and private property developers and the desire for a ‘modern’ city to shine when
hosting the World Cup. However, Skinner was very clear that she would be conducting
a more detailed analysis,47 and as of yet, that brief mention makes up the existing
literature on the actual state of affairs of Warwick Junction.

Conclusion
Despite the ongoing debates and concerns about the perceived disarray of the
informal trade sector, it continues to have a widespread presence on a global scale. A
review of the literature on informal trade policies shows that although many
governments attempt to turn a blind eye, this portion of the economy must eventually
be considered and accounted for. Yet the fact remains that, at least in South Africa,
Skinner, C. (2009). Challenging City Imaginaries. Agenda’s Special Issue on Gender and Poverty Reduction,
Vol. 81.,1-12. 9
47
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national mandates regarding the informal economy are unclear and much of the
legislative responsibility is passed on to local governments. This delegation results in
many of the informal economy matters being dealt with on a local level, resulting in
area-based management approaches as an effective means to develop and manage the
informal economy. The case study of Warwick Junction is such an example. Realizing
that disregarding an entire sector or implementing restrictive policies was ineffective,
Durban engaged in an area based policymaking and urban development process at the
end of the apartheid. Earlier, this paper explained the rationale behind and debates
surrounding ABPs. One characteristic of ABPs is that they are often seen as incubators
and laboratories to pioneer new policy approaches and strategies. Theoretically, if local
initiatives are successful, they ought to be passed along and implemented, perhaps with
changes based on the environment in other areas.48 In this case, that is exactly what
occurred at Warwick Junction. Yet recent events and the current situation of Warwick
indicates that the ABPs may not have been as effective as initial literature and reviews
believed it to be so, indicating a gap in academic evaluations.

Background Information
Although the literature review presents substantial information as to the context
of informal trade in South Africa and Durban, certain recent events, not yet covered in
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academic literature, merit commentary to understand the findings of this paper.
Namely, how the debates from the last five years have changed the landscape of
Warwick Junction.
One particularly salient debate stemmed from a proposed mall in the Warwick
Junction area. South Africa won the bid to host the Soccer World Cup in 2008. As
mentioned in the literature review, in anticipation of a major tourist event, aggressive
policing and policy often become the norm when a country is determined to appeal to
foreign eyes.49 This phenomenon held particularly true during the years preceding the
2010 World Cup. As part of Durban’s R6 billion redesign and development plans, in
May 2009, the city introduced a plan to upgrade and revitalize Warwick Junction. A city
spokesperson declared, “Durban’s neglected transportation hub, Warwick Junction is
set to receive a major facelift to make the city ready for the influx of visitors during the
spectacular soccer tournament.”50 The proposed development, with a R400 million
budget, was given a R100 million initial investment to begin the various stages of work,
which would ultimately include road and freeway realignments and a more logical
positioning of taxi ranks. Although these changes may have been acceptable,
community outraged surged at the last proposition: a new mall with banking and retail
facilities.51
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City officials, such as Michael Sutcliffe who was the City Manager at the time,
argued that the City was “making sure [it was] doing things that complement each
other,” and that the creation of a mall would incorporate three key developments for
the area. It would involve the private sector in an area it had not previously had a great
presence, as well as restructuring public transport across Warwick Junction, and
formalizing a tidier transportation hub. Lastly, according to Sutcliffe, this development
was intended to get the traders on the city’s side, as “the city promised to find space for
all the African traders” (emphasis added).52 The developers insisted the shopping center
would be able to accommodate 270 of the 300 traders the City recognized in the Early
Morning Market, while the ones who could not be integrated would be relocated to a
site 300 meters away.53 Generally, this side of the debate insisted that not only would
the mall improve traffic flow, it would provide a much-needed range of retail choices. A
representative for the development company, Themba Ngcobo, justified the shopping
center saying Urban-Econ, a development economy firm, had conducted a feasibility
study and found the need for a wider range of products. This, the developers insisted,
was the key: “If customers wish to buy from informal traders, they will still be welcome
do to so [but if they] prefer to buy from established branded shops in a secure center,
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that’s their choice too…. At present, they don’t have that choice.”54 Not only would this
provide necessary resources to the area, but advocates for the mall argued the time was
ripe. City officials pointed out that the national government was offering additional
funds for this type of development, just in time for the World Cup.55
However, the traders instantly called the City’s motives into question,
expressing resentment at and concerns with the proposal from the start. The initial city
hall meeting introducing the project met with resistance as traders expressed fears that
the consequences would ruin their livelihoods. Traders protested that the City failed to
follow the appropriate processes and that they were not consulted about the
development. Instead, traders were given two weeks notice to vacate the Early Morning
Market and move to premises on Alice Street. Further complaints surfaced as traders
asked why they needed another mall when there are currently eight within a 10km
radius of Warwick and “why a ‘first world’ mall was being imposed on ‘third world
people’?” Warwick Market Traders Association Chairman Harry Ramall summarized
the traders’ views when he said, “It was presented to us as a proposal but we could
read between the lines it was not a proposal; it was presented as what we are going to
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do – close the market and shut it down and relocate us to the materials management
building. But there was no viability study done.”56
In the end, the arguments against the development covered a few key issues.
Perhaps most importantly, the traders and their allies believed inadequate consultation
was conducted, “even at the conceptual stages.” Moreover, the development was
predicted to affect between 70,000 – 100,000 workers and their dependents for the 400
jobs the mall facilities would create.57 In addition, some concerns were raised that,
although the City and developers may not have been admitting it at the time, the mall
would continue to pose a threat to traders as it could always expand. In an op-ed in The
Mercury, academic Tim Quinlin said, “[Although this cannot be stated openly at
present, shopping malls inevitably feel the pressure to increase revenue and offset
municipal rates…. Having broken the back of the informal trade, it should be relatively
easy to expand.”58 The site’s historic integrity was also cited as a justification to
reconsider development plans, as demolishing the market for a mall would have
destroyed the area’s historic significance.59 Yet even another argument, that of race,
arose. Academic Franco Frescura voiced the opinion that the City’s proposal
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“represents a disregard for the years of struggle of the [black] traders and poor people
who kept this vital socio-economic institution alive at all costs.”60
The objections did not desist as traders maintained the “2010 mall would
starve them.” Instead of being placated by the City’s promises, informal traders alleged
that City officials attempted to bribe traders to make the development take place and
planned demonstrations and protests. However, the situation became tenser as events
progressed. Although traders applied to organize a peaceful march on city hall
remonstrating the development, police stopped the demonstration, insisting, “The
traders’ application to stage the march was declined.” Even external and independent
actors such as the urban planning consultant Dr. Susanna Godehart took sides, saying
that as far as she could see, “the development was completely illegal at [that] stage as
an environmental impact assessment to build on the market site had not been done.”
Tensions continued to build over the next months as traders continued to fight the
development. An incident in June 2009 illustrates the degree to which the antagonism
had reached. The police temporarily closed one market on June 15th, cordoning off the
area. In response, traders applied for a court order that would allow the vendors to
continue trading, insisting that the City had been accepting rent for the stalls and could
not bar the trade. The hostility erupted as the police sealed off the area. While accounts
differ, at some point the police fired rubber bullets at the traders who attempted to

60

Broughton, Tania. Warwick Traders’ Legal Action Gets a Boost. The Mercury. 14 September 2009.

36

make their way into the market. Traders insisted they were attacked without
provocation as they were not being violent, and that the police initiated the violence by
jumping over the wall and beginning to shoot. The police insisted they were forced to
fire to contain the traders. Nonetheless, five people sustained minor injuries and had to
be taken to Addington Hospital, while three people were arrested on public violence
charges.61
This incident demonstrates the extent of the tension that had developed between
the police and traders as a result of the proposed mall development. The debates
became acrimonious, finally resulting in a Provincial Task Team being called in to hear
concerns and find an acceptable solution.62 In an op-ed in The Mercury, developer
Themba Ngcobo insisted that, despite negative media coverage, the development had
support “from the overwhelming majority of Warwick stakeholders,” including, among
others, thousands of commuters and members of the public, the Durban Chamber of
Commerce and Industry, the Warwick Street Traders Committee, ACHIB, and the
eThekwini Informal Economy Forum.63 On the other side of the aisle, a team of experts,
ranging from academics to architects to attorneys to activists, joined the effort to save
the market. Caroline Skinner, Tim Quinlan, Bridgemohan Mahajaj, Richard Dobson,
Andrew Makin, Franco Frescura, Ashwin Trikamjee, Mahendra Chetty, and Fatima
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Meer “threw their weight” behind the traders. Summarizing their perspectives,
Professor Maharaj put it succinctly: “The development of the mall holds grave
consequences for the city and…would negate all the good work done through the
rejuvenation project.”64
Although that particular debate ended as the City gave in and agreed to leave
the Early Morning Market as it is, the memories have not faded and much of the tension
remains.

Methodology
Qualitative research in the form of interviews was the primary methodology for
this study. Although academic articles and newspaper reports supplemented much of
the information, conversations with the various stakeholders offered recent and
valuable insight. The nature of the topic dictated the methodology; as this project
concentrated on the current state of relationships in Warwick Junction, something
academic literature has not yet examined, the qualitative research methodology worked
best to capture the most recent information in an open-ended and explorative way.
Although newspaper articles offered current data, it was often not comprehensive or
relevant enough. Articles rarely discussed the state of relationships, instead focusing on
actual events (although these also played an important role in the findings). To best

64

Kuppan “Last Ditch Effort to Save Market”

38

understand the character of current relationships, the personal opinions of the involved
stakeholders, particularly their views on whether the area is inclusive, were key. The
biases inherent in people’s personal opinions were extremely relevant, and the research
process made an effort to identify and account for them.
To assist with connecting with the necessary stakeholders, I worked closely with
the staff at Asiye eTafuleni, an NGO based in Warwick Junction which works closely
with the traders. Not only was I able to interview the founders, Patrick Ndlovu and
Richard Dobson, who had been City government employees critically involved in the
iTRUMP Project during the period I was examining, but they were also able to
introduce me to formal and informal traders. In addition, Richard Dobson was able to
offer an introduction and secure my interview with Hoosen Moolla, the Area Manager
of iTRUMP. To interview actors with different perspectives, I approached past or
current City officials. Imraan Buccus, my academic advisor, was able to connect me to
former City Manager, Michael Sutcliffe, who subsequently gave me names to follow up
with.
When choosing my subjects, there was a conscious effort to gather a variety of
perspectives. I conducted a total of eight interviews, speaking with two informal traders
and one formal shopkeeper, two members of AeT who were active actors during the
period I examined, and three City officials who represented the relevant government
departments: the Business Support Unit and iTRUMP. In many ways, this gave me a
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diverse range of individuals in relation to racial and gender backgrounds. I spoke to
black, white and Indian individuals, and interviewed two women in addition to the six
men. Although there were some gaps in the demographics (no youths or coloureds
were interviewed), it seems unlikely that those gaps would have made a notable
difference.
Before entering the formal interviews, I drafted a list of interview questions
(Appendix A). Although there were some specific points for certain actors, each
interview began with gathering basic information about the individual’s history,
experiences and involvement in Warwick Junction. The intent of this background was
to better understand the individual’s experience and interests in the area. From there,
each interview attempted to cover the individual’s general opinion on informal trade,
the context of the institutions, policies, urban changes and interventions in Warwick
Junction, and the social relationships in relation to those issues.
Depending on convenience for the interviewee, the interviews took place in a
variety of places: cafes, traders’ stalls and offices. For the most part, I was able to
conduct the interview without a translator. However, there were some communication
barriers, particularly with the traders for whom English is a second language. Many
times I had to repeat or reword a question; it seemed as though the essence of the point
often got lost, which became one of the primary weaknesses of the methodology.
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A second key weakness was that several of the interviews, specifically the ones
requiring a translator, were conducted in the presence of an AeT staff member.
Although it seems unlikely that the traders would have drastically changed their
responses, it cannot be denied that the presence of another of the involved parties may
have swayed their responses.
As a participant, it is impossible to predict how my own presence changed the
terms of the interview, but it seems highly unlikely that a power dynamic negatively
affected the conversation. Each interviewee seemed enthusiastic to share his or her
opinion and did not appear pressured.
One unexpected addition to my research was the few informal interviews that
took place. I label these conversations as informal interviews because I did not conduct
an actual interview with consent forms or questions. They were a result of casual
conversations with various AeT staff members. However, immediately following these
conversations, I transcribed as much as possible. This latter information, mostly
gathered in the beginning of the research process, ultimately provided important and
much-needed direction to my research.
The population considered and interviewed for this project was not especially
vulnerable, making the methodological process uncomplicated. I was able to interview
a range of actors and as much as possible in the limited time allotted, was able to gather
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a diverse collection of perspectives. However, the collaboration and close relationship
built with AeT poses a potential element of impartiality in the interview respondents.

Limitations of the Study
Despite attempts to keep this study unbiased, there were, as always, certain
limitations that were impossible to circumvent. Issues such as personal biases, language
barriers, logistics, and time constraints presented challenges to obtaining a full picture.
In particular, my close relationship with AeT had the potential to create
concerns. I elected to work with the NGO because I felt my values aligned with theirs.
Although I attempted to interview unrelated actors, my questions were framed with the
experience and perspective I had gained at AeT. In addition, members of the AeT team
made some of my interviews possible, cementing the established relationship and
ensuing bias. On the part of my subjects, they were all aware of my relationship with
AeT, which could easily have colored their responses. Most importantly, my connection
with AeT made it very difficult for me to separate myself from their mindset and made
a fully objective study challenging to frame.
There were other issues that similarly could have arisen due to my presence in
the research. First of all, my identity as an American and foreigner may have created a
power dynamic I was unaware of and could not help. When dealing with the slightly
more vulnerable traders, they may have hesitated to speak to me or answered my
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questions as they thought they ought to (although none seemed to). That dynamic may
have similarly colored my interview with City officials who were eager to present
Durban in a positive light to a foreigner. In addition, my own hesitations made it
difficult for me to grasp a full and independent picture. Intimidated by the danger and
uncertainty of wandering into Warwick alone, I was unable to spend a substantial
amount of time in the field without an AeT staff member. Also, due to cultural
implications and my own desire to not offend, there were times when I was unable to
continue probing a subject or ask difficult questions.
Lastly, as always is the case, this project was constrained by time. Although the
calendar was largely adhered to, more time would have allowed for a fuller and more
in-depth examination.

Findings
The intent of this paper is to track the trajectory of Warwick Junction as a site of
inclusivity in the last twenty years, the immediate post-apartheid till now, November
2013. Much of the background discussed in the literature review provides this exact
narrative but to see the full arc, some of the history may be revisited. To put it in broad
terms, Warwick’s narrative of inclusivity, or lack thereof, may be broken up into three
key periods: Apartheid and pre-apartheid histories of exclusion and repression, the
“Golden Era” following the end of the apartheid, and the most recent deterioration of
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social relations and the return to old, apartheid era tactics. This section of the paper will
address each period and end with the implications of this trajectory.

Presence and Role of Informal Trade in Durban Today
As the literature review explained, informal trade is particularly prevalent in
many developing countries. This continues to be true in South Africa where the
informal economy contributes to 8-12% of the national GDP.65 However, while many
may see the informal trade sector as a nuisance, as much of the literature suggests, it
appears to be an accepted part of the economy. City officials, formal shopkeepers and
informal traders all recognize its importance and understand that it not only contributes
to the national economy but also serves as an important safety net.66 As former iTRUMP
Project Leader Richard Dobson points out, many South Africans are victims of a poor
education system and are subsequently unqualified to hold a range of jobs; coupled
with a substantial unemployment rate that particularly affects the youth, street vending
offers an entry point into the economy.67 It also provides an opportunity for this
population to pursue entrepreneurial activities.68 When discussing entry points, another
assertion is that informal trade plays an important role in the transformation of the
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economy. With a history as racially segregated as South Africa’s, it is also an entry point
into a freer market economy. Not only is it a factor of economic transformation but it
also serves as a tool to further cultural transformation because the products and services
informal traders sell have a cultural significance formal businesses are unable to
replicate.69 Lastly, connected to the concept of informal trading being a valuable
contributor to the national economy, it is an important part of the economic distribution
chain.70 What is remarkable is that actors representing diverse backgrounds, including
City officials, all agree to the importance of the informal economy, consistently
acknowledging that it provides an essential safety net for poor South Africans. Yet the
question is whether that recognition is corroborated by policy and implementation
towards the informal trade sector.

A History of Exclusion and its Effects
Globally, informal trade has had a long and repressive history. In South Africa,
this held particularly true, dating back from the colonial days.71 As the literature review
covered, colonial policies singled out black South African traders, completely
criminalizing the muthi trade and restricting all other rights and practices. Street
vendors were completely at the mercy of oppressive legislation and policing, while
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blacks were seen to simply be servicing white needs. The apartheid era, beginning in
1950, only saw more exclusive legislation and marginalization, which had a profound
effect on Warwick Junction. With Durban being segregated through the apartheid
mandate, there were few entry points into the city for black South Africans. Warwick
Junction, on the outskirts of downtown Durban, became that transportation hub and
soon saw thousands of bustling commuters pass through the area on a daily basis.72
However, despite the traffic Warwick was seeing, as a black centric area, the apartheid
government refused to develop the region and the infrastructure remained poor.73 The
streets and facilities were often unsuitable to the way they were being used, the roads
and drainage were in disrepair and, in many ways, Warwick was difficult to navigate.
The segregation from the apartheid manifested itself spatially as certain areas were
extremely difficult to access and blocked off from others.74
However, the certain events transpired in Durban during the 1980s which would
deeply impact informal trade. The Progressive Federal Party won local elections in
Durban in the early eighties. A more liberal group than the National Party, they
recognized the importance of street trade, going as far as to commission the Market
Survey and Hawker Report to assess the current approaches to street trading.75
Following the publication of these reports, the City Council recognized the need to shift
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its approach to street trading, finally acknowledging traders as a permanent fixture, and
a contributing factor to the economy. Although the City recognized the need for a new
approach, a former City Official says management was daunting.76 At this same time,
while the country was in chaos from the anti-apartheid protests, enforcement of street
trading laws became lax and traders began to move back into the cities wherever they
deemed convenient.77
As a result, Warwick Junction became a chaotic place, in terms of traders
crowding the streets and facilities breaking down from overuse and neglect.78 This
chaos created opportunities for crime, and Warwick soon became home to rampant
violence. In 1996, it was estimated that there were over 50 murders in the Warwick
area.79 Traders also recognized the disorder and talked about the “small paths to walk
through…shacks everywhere. It wasn’t safe to walk there.”80 These pressures created
hostility all around as police harassed vendors. A traditional medicine healer described
the conditions as ‘very bad.’ “You couldn’t sit where you wanted to sit. The police
would come and take all your stuff.”81 This tension escalated to the point that harassed
traders went as far as to “declare war” on the city police.82 The persecution and
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exclusion informal traders suffered from the apartheid government and the police was
taking a serious toll.

The “Golden Era”
One note must be made at the start of this section: the very notion that an
inclusive, “Golden Era” existed has been disputed. Namely, former City Manager
Michael Sutcliffe insisted one should not “romanticize the 1990s and that it was all
hunky dory.”83 Yet these conclusions will focus on the perspectives of the traders,
although it will make some mention of the perspectives of City officials, and assert there
was a period of inclusivity.
Warwick Junction, the notorious “crime and grime” area of Durban, began
attracting the City’s attention. As the City decided to clean up the area, the processes
were designed to be inclusive and engage the community as much as possible.84 In 1991,
forced to deal with the overcrowding of traders in Warwick, the City established the
Department of Informal Trade and Small Business Opportunities (DITSBO), which
would later become the Business Support Unit (BSU). In addition, the inner-eThekwini
Regeneration and Urban Management Program (iTRUMP) was mandated to assist with

83
84

Sutcliffe Formal Interview
Dobson Formal Interview

48

the regeneration process and clean up the area, specifically through the Urban Renewal
Project in 1996.85
There were a few key points considered from the start which played a large role
in framing the process. For one, as the apartheid era drew to a close and democracy
became the national mandate, there was a new feeling of reconciliation and a desire to
engage in inclusive processes. As Richard Dobson, an iTRUMP Project Leader, put it, in
many ways, there was a national euphoria and energy that the country had avoided an
outright war and was able to find peace. For Durban and informal trade reform, this
attitude translated into a conscious effort on the part of the City officials to consult
traders.86 The actors who led the Project were aware of this, and realized that innovation
in local governance was a necessity. Dobson said when he started at iTRUMP, he was
aware of two key facts: that design would be able to mitigate the urban management
challenges of informal trade, and that any design and implementation process would
have to be responsive to the needs of informal traders. In particular, there were a few
considerations which had to be continually kept in mind. Including the beneficiaries of
the projects was essential to understanding if, for one, the city was responding with the
right project, and if the technical processes would actually be effective. Lastly, the
whole process had to be sensitive to the disruption caused by the construction.87
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Dobson explained how, for local government, this entailed reconfiguring
institutional structures. It was clear that normal management processes would not be
effective, so it was agreed to engage in an area based management (ABM) scheme.
However, the structure that became the final process was unlike traditional ABMs.
Instead of creating a new team, which is the most expensive part of the process, the
project simply assembled officials from existing departments and moved them into one
building. Although they continued to maintain many of their old tasks, this
conglomeration of officials made collaboration much easier, as department silos were
spatially broken down. According to Dobson, from then on, everyone was much more
involved and there was a surge of energy.88
This energy assisted with the first challenge the Project tackled, revitalizing the
herb market facilities. From this process, the Project leaders were able to learn some
valuable lessons. In particular, the importance of consultation, innovative designs and
communicating those designs were critical to completing successful interventions. This
particular process also illustrated that unforeseen challenges, such as the dispensation
of facilities, had to be dealt with particularly delicately. In this case, after discovering
the quality of the new facilities the herb traders would receive, there was a sudden
increase in the number of healers and traders who needed trading spaces in that
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market. Consequentially, the Project managers focused on ensuring each trader was
located appropriately.89
Many of the actors involved in the regeneration Project echo the same sentiment,
largely attributing their success to the political and social climate following the
transition into democracy. The entire operation was a bottom-up process, focused on
integrating the beneficiaries into the development discussions and decision-making
process.90 City officials from that time insisted that knowing and respecting the traders’
work was critical to being able to work effectively with them. Former Area Based
Manager for the Business Support Unit Patrick Ndlovu said that they had to “think like
a trader. We had to put [ourselves] into their shoes.” That included understanding the
dynamics of their operations, particularly how and why they did things a certain way.
“Once you understand, then you can try to accommodate that. Asking questions allows
you to make informed decisions.” This investment in social relations, through the
capacity and desire to take the time to interact with and understand the traders, was
crucial.91
Another essential factor contributing to the success of the Renewal Project is the
resources available. In addition to the funds Durban was able to allocate to Warwick
Junction, this ABM area became one of five in KwaZulu-Natal that benefited from a
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European Union grant. Starting in the early 2000s, the EU gave out a few million rands
to five ABM initiatives: the airport and industrial estate area, the Kwamashu township,
a rural area, Cato Manor and iTRUMP in Warwick Junction. This funding, covering a
three-year period, alleviated some of the pressure on the city to continue pushing the
project on its own.92 One concern often raised in ABM initiatives is partisan funding, a
critique Durban had to be aware of when working in Warwick.
However, despite these factors that contributed to the success stories, there were
serious challenges for the ABM process in Warwick Junction. Much of the Project’s
success is attributed to the energy and collaboration of the actors involved; yet this
methodology and mechanisms to achieve success has implications. An important
consideration at the time was how to institutionalize the process and ensure its
sustainability.93 One part of this was formalizing Durban’s policy and approach to
informal trade through the Informal Economy Policy (IEP). The IEP, adopted in
February 2001, was unique in that it recognized that the informal economy is critical to
local economic development as it creates jobs and incomes for many of the area’s poorer
citizens. Some key findings included: the acknowledgement of the role of the informal
worker, the suggestion that area-based management zones be created, and a
commitment by the City to provide support for small business enterprises. For street
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traders in particular, there were three important acknowledgements that would directly
impact them, although it must be noted that current progress is less than ideal:94
• The IEP identified an integrated information system as a critical element for
moving “towards a better managed, more developmental and coordinated
approach, with incentives for registration and self-regulation.” Although some
progress has been made, this system has yet to be established.
• The IEP suggested the street trader by-laws be re-developed to “reflect the
overall policy move away from sanction and control, towards support and the
creation of new opportunities in a well-managed environment.” In 2002, Legal
Resources Centre drafted a new set of by-laws, but the previous ones remained
in place as of 2007.
• The IEP suggested supporting existing organizations to develop a support
service to help traders by advising them on how to become more
democratically constituted and providing a venue for these meetings to
increase trader representation. Instead, the Council established its own
committees to negotiate with. In addition, the Business Support Unit staff
developed a standard constitution for these committees which makes
membership compulsory for permit holders, completely contradicting the
IEP’s suggestion and violating the people’s constitutional right to association.95
While the IEP was one mechanism of institutionalization, another important
aspect of the sustainability of the work was tied to the actors managing the project.
Michael Sutcliffe, City Manager during this time, critiqued the process, insisting that the
Project leaders “drove iTRUMP [and the project] as individuals.”96 However, those
officials, such as Richard Dobson, insist they did their best to make the process as
independent as possible, attempting to ensure its maintenance.97
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However, as much as the methods may be critiqued, the Urban Renewal Project
had many successes. Now, Warwick Junction, an essential part of Durban, is considered
to be much safer; many traders have established sites to conduct their trading, and there
is a sense of ownership and pride in the area.98

The Deterioration of Social Relations
However, despite the progress made by the iTRUMP Project, it seems as though
the conditions in Warwick Junction may be deteriorating. A former Area Manager said
that since 2008, “you could tell the City [started] diverting to the old tactics of being
anti-informal traders.”99
He added that much of the area is falling back into disrepair. Unsatisfied traders
complain that the city does a poor job maintaining their facilities, many of which are
breaking down.100 They insist that it has “been a long time” since the City has helped
them. They accuse the City of “sending the police to get [our] goods.”101 As the leader of
the herb market said, “if something’s broken, they’re bad to help come fix it, but quick
to come collect rent.”102 This statement illustrates how informal traders view the city:
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reluctant to assist when something breaks or fails to function, a common occurrence,
according to informal traders interviewed for this project.
As a result of the deteriorating facilities, social relations between informal traders
and City officials are similarly breaking down. There is mistrust and a lack of empathy
for the other perspective on both sides. When asked about relations with the City and
current development processes, the traders interviewed expressed disgust and
skepticism, accusing the City of having its own agenda.103 One declared that the City’s
“priority is now to build revenue, not to develop” or provide opportunities.104 In
particular, much of this anger seems directed at the Business Support Unit, the
government department in charge of management and development of informal traders
in the Warwick area. Traders have little faith in BSU, insisting “it does bad to the
traders,” and have even taken to calling it the ‘Business Destroyer Unit.’105 Much of this
hostility comes from the fact that BSU has seen substantial turnover derived from
informal trade permits in the last decade, and traders complain that the new officials do
not understand how things are or should be.106 Another critical point is that BSU pays
the salaries of the auxiliary police force, the team responsible for impounding traders’
goods.107 These are the same police officials who are blamed for harassing traders:
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“The police are willing to confiscate anything, and try to as much as possible.
They will walk around the area, stopping at each table and asking the traders for
permits. If the permits are out of date, they don’t offer a warning, but
immediately confiscate the goods on the spot. The traders cannot even renew the
permits when the police come, but must go to another office.”108
In addition, among traders and the organizations that work on their behalf, there
seems to be a widely held belief that BSU fails to take trader needs into account. The
proposed 2010 mall is a commonly cited example of the City failing to consult or
include traders.109 Traders maintain this is a common trend and there is little
communication. Instead, they complain that “now [the City] just shows us the plan
without consulting us.”110
This frustration further translates into a lack of interest in the current system. The
head of the herb market, a community leader, expressed her apathy with the “broken
system.” She complained that current BSU employees have no vision, and that the City
Manager is a ‘puppet’ of political pressure. No City representative was safe from her
contempt, including the city council, as she said explained how useless she believes it is
to vote for City councilors.
“You have to get one that would understand. So you must vote for councilors
who understand. We pushed for an old trader to be a councilor but now he’s
useless too. We would give him a list of requirements but he’s come back and [he
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says] there’s not enough [in the] budget. Nothing is moving [now]. Everything
you see now is from the 1990s and 2000s.”111
Another informal trader echoed a similar sentiment when asked about trying to make
his opinion and needs known. “I don’t know now, these new people [at BSU]. So many
times we tried to raise issues but there was nothing done, nobody listened, nothing
changed. We’re just seen as rubbish people.”112
On the other side of the spectrum, City officials similarly echo frustration with
the processes and relations with informal traders. Although accounts differ, officials
from various departments agree that there are serious tensions between the City and
traders.
The current iTRUMP Manager Hoosen Moolla, who has had a long history of
working in Warwick, insists his department has historically had an excellent
relationship and engagement with informal traders. He describes iTRUMP’s
management approach as bottom-up, with consultation being an integral part of any
decision making process; “we [don’t] just go in there, we [make] an effort to consult
[them].” Although he concedes that certain projects have caused tension, like the 2010
mall proposal, he attributes much of the antagonism to BSU-trader relations. “That was
an instance when the City didn’t go through the ABM approach and hoodwinked
[everyone].” Although he recognizes relations with traders have not been fully
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repaired, he, like many of the traders, ascribes the friction to BSU, insisting, “they
created most of the damage…[they] are the challenge.”113
However, BSU officials hold a very different view. BSU Deputy Head Thulani
Nzama challenges any assertion that relations were tense between BSU officials and
informal traders. Instead, he attributed any conflict to internal disagreements between
traders and their own street committees. Insisting that that relationship dynamic is the
source for “all struggles for power,” Nzama asserts that the influences from street
committees and external stakeholders, such as NPOs, incite unrest and frustration. In
addition, he maintains that BSU makes an effort to engage in inclusive processes. There
are three key forums he cites as opportunities to work with informal traders:
consultation at the local level, mass meetings every two months that are open to all
traders and their committees, and ‘The Forum’ meetings, led by City Councilors every
three months to interact with representatives from trade organizations and the informal
traders.
“The process is very effective. Only problem is that when there’s a consultation,
it doesn’t mean we always agree or [everyone] will be happy. We may agree to
disagree. Sometimes it’s just ‘this is what we’re planning, here are the pros and
cons.’ Some people may not be happy but that doesn’t mean we didn’t
deliver.”114
Nzama’s statement illustrates a key attitude the City holds regarding informal trade:
that traders create problems by having unrealistic expectations. In particular, Nzama
113
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complains of traders being completely unaware of the scope of budgetary challenges.
He insists that informal traders do not understand the reality of being in the informal
economy sector, and continue to ask for more resources and services, failing to
recognize that the funds to deliver those queries do not exist. “But once they start
getting something, then they just want more,” Nzama said. “They don’t understand
that to pay for those extra things, we’ll have to charge higher rents and they’ll have to
pay more. But in their eyes, they only see you as a government official and expect you
to deliver everything.”
Former City Manager Michael Sutcliffe reflects this exasperation with trader
attitudes when he noted the traders’ failure to adjust to modern society. He asserts that
many of the points informal sector advocates make against development are out of date.
In particular addressing the 2010 mall controversy, he said, “if we were living in a
socialist society, you could use those arguments, but I’m sorry. We’re not.” Instead, he
insists that implementing development plans would show whether the progress he
championed as City Manager was truly desired by the community. Although this
assertive implementation approach ultimately caused uproar throughout Warwick
Junction, he insisted the most effective strategy would have been to “let the community
decide if they don’t want a mall. If they don’t want the new facilities [such as a mall],
it’ll fail.”115
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Research Analysis
The object of this paper is to track the trajectory of inclusivity in Warwick
Junction. A few things are now evident: the history of the area is tumultuous but seems
to cover times of subsequent collaboration, exclusion and repression. However, another
key point is that many of the accounts vary and any finding this paper concludes is
likely to be challenged by at least some of the stakeholders.
Nonetheless, some effort must be made to explain the end of the “golden era”
and the “return to old tactics.” A wide range of explanations has been offered, ranging
from institutional apathy, a few critical moments or unsuitable officials managing the
area.
One crucial moment commonly cited as a catalyst for tension in Warwick was the
mall proposal for the 2010 World Cup and the ensuing debate. Many, in particular City
officials, seem to see it as the moment when relations began breaking down, and
recognized that the damage caused would take a substantial amount of time and effort
to heal.116
Yet that single event does not account for all the conflict surrounding
development projects in Warwick: traders voiced complaints dating back from the mid
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2000s.117 Although much of the literature surrounding Warwick Junction is written in
the mid-2000 period and highlights the area as a shining example of innovative and
effective ABM, it seems that, while those findings were being documented, hostility was
brewing. Traders blame turnover at BSU, contending the department is full of new
people who refuse to collaborate with them and are too arrogant to take the time to
understand their old system.118
A related argument considers the leaders who are now managing BSU rather
than simply looking at the institution. One change in the last decade, which is likely to
have affected an ABM initiative, is that iTRUMP’s jurisdiction substantially expanded.
While iTRUMP, still located in the heart of Warwick, used to focus entirely on Warwick,
its mandate now covers nine areas, including the Umgeni Estuary and the
southernmost point of the Durban coast.119 Although iTRUMP officials deny that the
expansion affected their work in Warwick Junction, a common issue in ABM is that
when areas change, particularly if they expand, the quality and method of management
changes as well. On another note, one criticism leveled at the Urban Renewal Project
leaders is that the institutions and processes were not sustainable. City officials in
particular argue individuals drove organizations such as iTRUMP.120 While some of the
leaders who were criticized responded that they did their best to create as many
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independent thinkers as possible, if this was the case, it could have consequential
repercussions. A personality-centric project or ABM initiative is less likely to succeed in
the long term, once those individuals are no longer affiliated to the work.
However, one last explanation is the possibility that the deteriorating
relationships are simply a result of post-apartheid era national energy subsiding.
Richard Dobson, former Project Leader of iTRUMP, put it plainly: “Quite simply, it
boils down to the honeymoon period being over.” He attributes the traders’ frustration
to a lack of problem-solving oriented people supervising the area and the ensuing
neglect or institutional mismanagement of informal trading. The ABM approach used in
the late 1990s only temporarily changed how the government conducts business, and
failed to fully change the nature and attitudes of civil servants and their approaches.121

Conclusions
To understand Warwick as a site of inclusivity, this paper narrated the history of
informal trade in Durban, and what changes have occurred in the past twenty years.
Although Warwick Junction has had an admirable past of innovative solutions to urban
development and management, this paper asserts this is no longer the case. While the
importance of informal trade is widely acknowledged, there is a disconnect between the
policies created, implementation, and what is desired on the ground. Traders are
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vehement in their censure of City management, and even government officials admit
that Warwick is in desperate need of repair and restoration. Yet both sides acknowledge
the difficulties of working with their counterparts.
This paper has offered a variety of explanations accounting for the deterioration
of management methods, and with them social relations. Yet the case remains that there
is a lack of analysis in academic literature, virtually all of which simply examines
Warwick until the mid 2000s. Whether it is simply the effect of negative turnover in a
government department, or a failed ABM process, something shifted drastically. One
intriguing possibility is that this is the result of the post-apartheid euphoria wearing off.
This premise has interesting implications as to the sustainability of policies and how a
fledging democracy fares a few decades later.
Nonetheless, there are substantive issues preventing innovation and
collaboration from growing in Warwick. In particular, a lack of communication and
conflicting ideologies pose considerable challenges. In cases such as the 2010 mall,
traders see the development, as it is proposed, as a threat to their livelihood, and
consequently resist it. As a result, the City sees the traders as adverse to any progress or
improvement. This conflict makes the City less likely or willing to work with the
traders, further infuriating them and creating a perpetuating cycle. However, there is a
disconnect in that traders are not necessarily opposed to development, but need to be
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included in the process.122 Yet in the end, in many ways, the progress informal traders
would be likely to support would be development that improves their infrastructure
and facilities, rather than changing the nature of trading opportunities. Perhaps it
simply comes down to differing definitions of development and ideological opinions
that cannot be reconciled.
It appears that the City perspective follows the “Western” notions of
development, while others advocate maintaining the historical integrity of the informal
sector. Perhaps there is simply a tension between different urban management
philosophies, and conflicting opinions on how to shape Durban’s urban future.
This paper asserts that this is the crux of the issue, and fundamentally what the
issues have been and will continue to be about. However, as the case stands, the City
and informal trade sector stand at polar ends, unable to reach an ideological
compromise. Whether or not this agreement is possible is not addressed in this paper. It
may well be the case that an innovatively inclusive city has discovered how to maintain
the heritage of informal trade while keeping up with global expectations of “world-class
urbanism.”123 It can only be hoped that such an understanding can be reached in
Warwick Junction.

Dlamini Formal Interview
Dobson, R. and T. Quazi. Critique from the Streets: Parallels between Turkey, Brazil and South Africa.
Asiye eTafuleni. 14 August 2013. < http://www.aet.org.za/2013/08/critique-from-the-streets-the-parallels-betweenturkey-brazil-and-south-africa/>
122
123

64

Bibliography
Bromley, R. (2000). Street Vending and Public Policy: A Global Review. The International
Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 20.1/2, 1-28.
Broughton, Tania. Warwick Traders’ Legal Action Gets a Boost. The Mercury. 14
September 2009.
Cameron, J., Odendaal, N. & Todes, A. (2004) Integrated Area Development Projects:
Working towards Innovation and Sustainability. Urban Forum, Vol. 15, No. 4. 316
Comins, L. Anger About R400 Million Mall Plan. The Daily News. 21 May 2009.
Comins, L. This 2010 Mall Will Starve Us. The Daily News. 27 May 2009.

65

Cross, J. (2000). Street Vendors, Modernity and Postmodernity: Conflict and
Compromise in the Global Economy. The International Journal of Sociology and
Social Policy 20.1/2, 29-51.
Dlamini, Z. Informal Trader. Formal Interview. 11 November 2013.
Dobson, R. Former Project Leader. Formal Interview. 14 November 2013.
Dobson, R. and C. Skinner. (2009). Working in Warwick: Including Street Traders in
Urban Plans. University of KwaZulu-Natal School of Development Studies. Print.
Dobson, R. and T. Quazi. Critique from the Streets: Parallels between Turkey, Brazil and
South Africa. Asiye eTafuleni. 14 August 2013. <
http://www.aet.org.za/2013/08/critique-from-the-streets-the-parallels-betweenturkey-brazil-and-south-africa/>.
Dobson, R. and T. Quazi. Urban Utopia of Exclusivity versus Urban Realism of
Inclusivity: Mall or Market Place? Asiye eTafuleni. 28 May 2012.
<http://www.aet.org.za/2012/05/urban-utopia-of-exclusivity-versus-urbanrealism-of-inclusivity-mall-or-market-place/>.
Hunter, N. and C. Skinner. (2003). Foreign Street Traders Working in Inner City
Durban: Local Government Policy Challenges. Urban Forum, Vol. 14, No. 4,
October-December 2003, 301-319.
Moolla, H. iTRUMP Senior Manager. Formal Interview. 18 November 2013.
Mthembu, B. Durban Sets 2010 Plans into Action. The Daily Mail. 12 September 2006.

66

Nesvag, S. (2000). Street Trading from Apartheid to Post-Apartheid: More Birds in the
Cornfield? The International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 20.3/4, 34-63.
Ndlovu, P. Former Area Based Manager. Formal Interview. 14 November 2013.
Ndlovu P. Former Area Based Manager. Informal Interview. 31 October 2013.
Ndlovu, S. Market Traders, Cops Clash. The Daily News. 16 June 2009.
Ngcobo, T. In the Face of Criticism, Warwick Junction Developers Put Their Side of the
Story. The Mercury. 30 July 2009.
Nzama, T. Business Support Unit Deputy Head. Formal Interview. 20 November 2013.
Khomo, J. Informal Trader. Formal Interview. 12 November 2013.
Kuppan, I. Last-Ditch Effort to Save Market: Municipality to Fight It. The Daily News. 23
July 2009.
Quazi, T. (2011). An Analysis of Municipal Approaches to Incorporating the Informal
Economy into the Urban Fabric: A Comparative Study Msunduzi Local
Municipality (Pietermaritzburg) and Hibiscus Coast Municipality (Port
Shepstone). University of KwaZulu-Natal School of Development Studies, 1-82.
Quinlan T. Why is the City Failing to Provide Explanations on Warwick? The Mercury. 7
August 2009.
Reddy, L. Formal Shopkeeper. Formal Interview. 14 November 2013.

67

Shipley, B. and R. Richards. (2013). Warwick Junction Urban Renewal Project.
Participedia. <http://participedia.net/en/cases/warwick-junction-urban-renewalproject>.
Sithole, P. Misinformation Muddies Issues Around Market Move. The Mercury. 11
August 2009.
Skinner, C. (2009). Challenging City Imaginaries. Agenda’s Special Issue on Gender and
Poverty Reduction, Vol. 81.,1-12.
Skinner, C. (2008). Street Trade in Africa: A Review. Women in Informal Employment:
Globalizing and Organizing, Working Paper No. 51, 1-37.
Skinner, C. (2008). The Struggle for the Streets: Processes of Exclusion and Inclusion of
Street Traders in Durban, South Africa. Development Southern Africa Vol. 25, No. 2,
227-242.
Trading Economics. South African Unemployment Rate. 25 November 2013.
<http://www.tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/unemployment-rate>.
Sutcliffe, M. Former City Manager. Formal Interview. 11 November 2013.
Turok, I. (2004). The Rationale for Area-Based Policies: Lessons from International
Experience. Urban Reconstruction in the Developing World: Learning through an
International Best Practice, 405-412.

68

Appendix A: Interview Guide
Personal Information
•
•
•

Name
Profession
Length of residence in Durban

General Opinions on Trade
•

In your opinion, what is the role of informal trade in the national economy?

Context (institutions, policy, urban changes and interventions)
•
•
•

What has been/is your involvement in Warwick Junction
How long were/have you been involved in that capacity?
Have you observed urban changes over time?
o What led to these changes?
o What were the interventions implemented, and what were the motivations?
 City officials: what kind of support, resource and mandates did/do you
have from the national/provincial government?

Social Relations (in relation to the above)
•

•

•

How long have relations between stakeholders (government officials, traders, and their
organizations or third parties) been historically?
o How have they changed?
Has there been an effort to include informal traders in development and policy talks?
o If so, how would you rate that effort?
o Who were the key players involved?
o What were the critical moments?
What were the biggest challenges you faced?

Current
•

In your mind, what would be an ideal policy regarding Warwick Junction?
o What are the biggest barriers to achieving that?
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Appendix B: Timeline of Events and the Implications
YEAR
1891
1895
1897

EVENT
Chapter 14 Code of Natal Law
Zululand Proclamation
Act No. 18

1909

Native Beer Act

1910
1916

Native Affairs By-Laws

1923

Native (Urban Areas) Act

1928

1950

Medical, Dental and Pharmacy
Act
Black (Urban Areas)
Consolidation Act
Group Areas Act

1957

Witchcraft Suppression Act

1962
1973

Durban Street Trading By-Laws
Natal Ordinance

Late
1970’s
Early

Hawkers Action Committee

1945

Progressive Federal Party wins

IMPLICATIONS
Legislation limiting muthi trade
Further legislation limiting muthi trade
Legislation restricting licenses for wholesale and
retail dealers; gave discretionary power to refuse
licenses
Established a municipality monopoly on beer
negatively affecting beer traders
Traders begin selling at Early Morning Market
Durban Town Council establishes precise
procedures for the registration of “Natives,”
limiting their access into the city
A result of Stallard Commission Report and,
concluding “Africans were only required in cities
to service white needs,” they should depart back
to the reserves
Further legislation limiting muthi trade
Imposed restrictions on economic activities in
“black areas”
Excluded people from areas of the city based on
their race, effectively barring Africans from
trading
Completely illegalizes open trading of medicine
and herbs
Outlawed street trading in the city
Established “move along” laws which forced
informal traders to move from their vending site
within fifteen minutes
Mounted a protest against Durban for its
mistreatment of hawkers in the area
A more liberal party than the National Party, the

70
1980’s

local Durban election

1983
1984

Market Survey published
Hawker Report published

1985

Councilor Subcommittee
established

Mid
1980’s
1987
1991

1991

1993

1994
1994

1994
1995

National White paper of
Privatization and Deregulation
Businesses Act

Department of Informal Trade
and Small Business Operations
(DITSBO) established
Amended Business Act

Durban Health Department
introduces health training
program for traders
Self Employed Women’s Union
established
Durban by-laws published

1995

Informal Traders Management
Board (ITMB) established

1996

Urban Renewal Project launched

1997

Traders Against Crime formed

PFP commissions the Market Survey and Hawker
Report to assess current approaches to street
trading
Report assessing approaches to street trading
Survey of traders which, in conjunction to the
Market study, found ways to reform policies
A city committee established to attempt to find
ways to implement more practical and favorable
policies for street traders
National influx control laws become
unenforceable
National government publication suggesting a
more tolerant approach to black, small businesses
National legislation helped to deregulate business
activities, removed barriers to the operation of
informal activities and made it an offense to move
along laws
Department formed to reconsider Durban’s
approach to informal trade
Allowed local authorities to create municipality
by-laws, in particular declaring restricted and
prohibited time zones
First democratic election in South Africa
Traders are no longer seen as temporary
participants
Organization established on the behalf of traders,
to protect traders
Some inner city areas became prohibited trade
zones but most became restricted trade sites.
However, in conjunction with national legislation,
traders who breached the by-laws or traded in
prohibited areas were subject to fines and their
goods being impounded
Another organization established to represent
traders and create communication pathways
between traders, city and council to negotiate
A major regeneration project for Warwick
Junction
Collaborative effort between traders, South
African Police Service and the Durban
Metropolitan Police

71
1997-2000
1999
2000

Urban Renewal Project delivers over R40 million
in capital works and reform
Informal Economy Policy task
team formed
Municipalities Act

2001
June 2004
November Council approves Public Realm
2004
Management Project
December Siyagunda established
2005
November Trader march on city council
2006
2008

Asiye eTafuleni established

2009

Durban city council proposes
mall development in Warwick
Junction
Raid on taxi drivers and informal
traders

April 2013

Mandates a democratic decision making process,
including stakeholder consultation, in the
municipality
Durban adopts a new, inclusive policy towards
street traders
Metro police seize traders’ goods at various
points across cities
A R3.7 million budget assigned to a project to
employ and equip 50 Metro police officers to
patrol informal trade areas
Organization of street barbers to protect and
represent their rights
Siygunda, the Eye and the Phoenix Plaza
Association went to city council to deliver memo
of demands to stop police harassment
A Warwick Junction advocacy group formed to
work with traders and city officials
Results in massive uproar and uprising across
Warwick Junction

